CHICAGO — A state appeals panel has ruled Illinois state law doesn't block the city of Chicago from impounding vehicles and imposing fines on the cars' owners.
The appellate ruling upheld an earlier decision from Cook County Judge Anna Loftus, who granted the city’s motion to dismiss a complaint from five named plaintiffs.
Those plaintiffs who were owners of vehicles impounded between August 2016 and April 2017, had argued the city’s impoundment ordinance is unenforceable, which should nullify penalties assessed against them.
Loftus had agreed with the city’s position the plaintiffs lacked standing because the Illinois Vehicle Code doesn’t pre-empt the city's impound ordinance, an issue the plaintiffs challenged on appeal.
The Illinois First District Appellate Court ruled on that appeal in an order issued July 9. Justice Sharon Oden Johnson Colemam wrote the decision; Justices Mary Mikva and Maureen Connors concurred. The order was issued under Supreme Court Rule 23, which may restrict its use as precedent.
According to Johnson, the plaintiffs said the city’s ordinance improperly regulated administrative penalties, but Judge Loftus held the relevant Vehicle Code governs only fees “and therefore did not interact with the impoundment ordinance’s penalty provisions.” Further, the city’s home rule powers enable it to implement a hearing and notice schedule and that even if the Vehicle Code applied to the case, “its notice provisions were directory, and no violation was actionable.”
Loftus dismissed all the remaining claims as derivative of the initial allegations, with prejudice, and noted her decision didn’t stop the plaintiffs from challenging the impoundments of their vehicles through the city’s administrative process. The panel noted the plaintiffs didn’t challenge the 1988 impoundment ordinance directly, but only argued the Vehicle Code was pre-emptive.
“If the Legislature did not specifically limit or deny home rule authority, a municipal ordinance and a state statute may operate concurrently as provided by the Illinois Constitution,” Oden Johnson wrote. “Additionally, such limitation or denial of home rule authority must be expressly stated.”
The panel further noted the Vehicle Code expressly lets a county or municipality regulate the impoundment and release of vehicles, including with imposition of administrative fees.
“However, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, nowhere in that section is there an explicit limitation on the power of a home rule unit to charge an administrative penalty or fine for the underlying violation that led to the impoundment of the vehicle,” Oden Johnson wrote.
Using the same reasoning, the panel explained the plaintiffs’ challenges to the notice provisions of the city ordinance also fail. The Vehicle Code says governmental units should reasonably notify a vehicle’s owner, but the law doesn’t stipulate a specific time period.
“The impoundment ordinance provides that the owner will be notified within 10 days by certified mail that the vehicle has been impounded as well as their right to have a hearing,” Oden Johnson wrote. “The impoundment ordinance further allows the owner or lessee to request a hearing, within 15 days after the notice of impoundment was given, with such hearing to be no more than 30 days later.”
The plain language of these provisions, the panel surmised, leads to the conclusion they aren’t inconsistent. The justices likewise agreed with Loftus in determining the Vehicle Code, with regards to notification, directs conduct and doesn’t mandate because “there is an absence of language specifying a particular consequence of noncompliance with the provision.”
On appeal, the plaintiffs also argued Loftus abused discretion by staying discovery on Chicago’s motion to dismiss, but the panel said the record doesn’t show where Loftus issued such an order. The plaintiffs wanted access to a Chicago report to the General Assembly in which it detailed costs associated with impoundment, but Loftus found that information wouldn’t have been relevant to the issue of if the Vehicle Code precluded the ordinance.
Finally, the panel said Loftus properly denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint. Adding another “plaintiff and additional counts based on the city’s lack of jurisdiction to hold administrative hearings under the impoundment ordinance would" amount to a new complaint instead of just curing defects, Oden Johnson wrote.