A state appeals panel awarded a new trial to a driver who had been ordered to pay $800,000 for her role in a collision with a motorcyclist, saying a judge wrongly blocked jurors from hearing expert testimony over whether the motorcyclist may have been intoxicated at the time of the crash.
The motorcyclist, identified as Tsujiorka Walker, originally sued the driver, Lakesha Steward, as a result of injuries sustained in a May 2015 crash.
After a jury ruled in Walker’s favor, Steward challenged the outcome before the Illinois First District Appellate Court saying Cook County Judge Clare McWilliams improperly excluded testimony from a doctor who said Walker might have been intoxicated at the time of the incident.
Justice Jesse Reyes wrote the panel’s decision, issued March 22; Justices David Ellis and David Navarro concurred. The order was issued under Supreme Court Rule 23, which may restrict its use as precedent.
The crash happened in suburban Riverdale. According to court records, Steward went from a restaurant to her car, parked southbound on Indiana Avenue. While making a U-turn toward the northbound lane, Steward’s car struck Walker’s motorcycle, which rendered Walker “unconscious and caused him serious injuries, including a week spent in a coma,” Reyes wrote.
Steward raised affirmative defenses to Walker’s lawsuit, including allegations of improperly operating the motorcycle or being drunk. During discovery, Steward presented Jerrold Leiken, a doctor who said he specializes in medical toxicology. Walker’s attorney raised a standing objection at the beginning of Leiken’s deposition and, before the trial, moved to bar any evidence regarding Walker’s blood alcohol content.
Although Leiken testified Walker’s records show a BAC of 0.126, exceeding the legal limit of 0.08, Walker's attorneys cited a 2011 Illinois First District Appellate opinion, Petraski v. Thedos, which they said established a toxicologist’s opinion on intoxication drawn from a blood sample is inadmissible without corroborating evidence of speeding or other erratic behavior.
At the deposition, Walker’s team got Leiken to acknowledge he didn’t know the speed of either vehicle, whether the collision might have been avoidable or what Walker had been doing before the crash. He further said although the medical report showed Walker had consumed alcohol that day, Walker was comatose when he arrived at the hospital, Leiken was unaware of the source of that information, and also unaware of hospital policies regarding calibration of its blood serum testing devices or the chain of custody for that sample.
Judge McWilliams agreed to keep the jury from hearing any of Leiken’s testimony, in part saying, “I’m looking at Petraski and I believe I’m following it and it’s quite textbook and it channels this case.”
On appeal, Walker argued Steward functionally waived opposition to Leiken’s testimony by waiting for a pretrial hearing to raise objections that should’ve surfaced during the deposition. The panel disagreed, saying the deposition record includes many of the foundational issues. However, it agreed with Walker’s take on Judge McWilliams' reliance on and analysis of Petraski.
That was another case of a driver turning into an oncoming vehicle which required multiple trials, the second of which also involved expert testimony from Leiken. When the appeals panel at that time ordered a new trial, it did so upon finding “there was no proper basis for Dr. Leiken’s opinion, since he did not take into account any specific information about the plaintiff personally or about the events leading up to the accident.”
In ruling for Walker, Justice Reyes explained that while Judge McWilliams said “you’re not able to take this blood alcohol level in a vacuum without corroborating evidence,” the Cook County judge applied the wrong standard. Reyes said the Petraski precedent does not say “that expert testimony as to blood alcohol level required corroborating evidence to be admissible.”
While McWilliams was correct with respect to Leiken’s opinion concerning whether he believed Walker may have been intoxicated or impaired, the appellate panel said the judge should have allowed Leiken to testify specifically about Walker’s blood alcohol content “and to the effects of alcohol consumption generally.” Reyes noted the Illinois Vehicle Code creates a presumption of “under the influence” for anyone with a BAC exceeding 0.08 and said Leiken’s testimony “identical to the testimony that we found should have been admitted” in the original Petraski trial.
The panel said it did not need to consider Walker’s arguments about the propriety of jury instructions because it ruled Judge McWillams abused discretion by barring the entirety of Leiken’s testimony and ordered a new trial.