A state appeals panel has agreed a commercial property’s “For Sale” sign doesn’t mean the property owners must pay for the injuries of an uninvited motorcyclist who drove onto the property and off a cliff.
Thomas Ludwig filed a lawsuit on Cook County Circuit Court seeking compensation for medical bills and lost wages incurred in an Aug. 31, 2014, incident where his motorcycle fell off a cliff on the border of two properties. He named as defendants B&R Corporation and banking entities who jointly owned a parcel listed for $5.5 million, as well as Timothy Hawken and State Bank of Countryside, which owned the adjoining property.
Cook County Judge Kathleen Burke granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, without specifying reasons, and then denied a motion to reconsider. Ludwig challenged the outcome before the Illinois First District Appellate Court.
Justice Mathias Delort wrote the panel’s decision, issued March 31; Justices Raymond Mitchell and Freddrenna Lyle concurred. The order was issued under Supreme Court Rule 23, which may restrict its use as precedent.
Ludwig was riding with two friends, according to court documents, and said the fall forced an elbow replacement. He sought medical bills of $99,220 and $16,000 in lost wages. Delort noted Ludwig’s annual income was about $45,000 at the time, but Ludwig still claimed he was a potential buyer who only “entered the property for the purpose of viewing and potentially purchasing" the land, worth millions of dollars.
In his fourth amended complaint, Ludwig said the B&R defendants owed a duty of care and failed to provide notice of the cliff. His complaint against the State Bank of Countryside alleged excavation work on the property caused the cliff on the B&R property over which he fell.
During a deposition, Delort wrote, Ludwig testified to having seen the large plywood “For Sale” sign but no markings prohibiting trespassing. But Terri Alexander, the real estate agent who listed the property, testified there were multiple “No Trespassing” signs, the entrance was gated, chained and locked — and still locked when she arrived shortly after the fall — and further that Ludwig never contacted her about viewing the land.
“In addition to the difficulty of parsing Ludwig’s arguments and claims of error, we note the numerous deficiencies in his appeal,” Delort wrote, adding that “Supreme Court rules must be followed; they are not mere suggestions.”
On the merits, the panel rejected Ludwig’s argument the “For Sale” sign made him an invitee to the property rather than a trespasser injured while on property to which he had not been invited. Delort explained the “contention that a for-sale sign can serve in lieu of the express or implied consent from an owner amounts to nothing more than what he thinks premises liability law should be. But Ludwig fails to cite to any authority that supports his argument.”
By contrast, the panel noted the defendants cited opinions endorsing their arguments on premises liability, and said there was no dispute Ludwig trespassed on the Countryside property, which wasn’t marked for sale. The panel proceeded to review the remainder of Ludwig’s arguments by considering a landowner’s duty of care to trespassers and quoted the Premises Liability Act, which establishes no such duty “other than to refrain from willful and wanton conduct that would endanger the safety of a known trespasser.”
Not only does the record lack evidence of willful or wanton conduct, Delort wrote, “Ludwig did not allege that either defendant acted willfully and wantonly in any of his complaints. There was no indication in the record that the defendants deliberately intended to harm Ludwig, or that they exhibited a conscious disregard for his welfare.”
The cases Ludwig cited didn’t apply, the panel said, because they either involved a tenant, not a trespasser, or someone injured on their own property when struck by a neighbor’s tree.