A federal appeals court says an Illinois man who was approved for parole, but remained in prison for another year because Illinois correctional officials allegedly failed to approve a residence upon his release, can move forward with a lawsuit against the state officials he said unconstitutionally kept him in prison by failing or refusing to do their jobs.
James Courtney served three years in prison and one year of mandatory supervised release for violating an earlier term of parole by failing to register as a sex offender. He was to be released on Oct. 4, 2013, and his term of mandatory supervised release was to begin. He was required to identify a host site where he would reside during his term of release, subject to approval from the Illinois Department of Corrections.
More than a year before his scheduled release, he submitted two potential host sites to the Field Service office for investigation, according to court documents. He later reportedly sent another potential host site and, at another time, he sent another letter, with his plans. Of the proposed residences, only one address was submitted by the Field Service office for investigation, and was rejected by the parole office in August 2013. No one at the IDOC submitted Courtney for placement at the halfway house or referred him to the Placement Resource Unit for assistance.
The day Courtney was scheduled to be released, a correctional officer allegedly told him he had been “violated” and would not be leaving prison that day. His parole violation report recommended he remain at the Menard prison until appropriate housing was found. More than a month later, the Prisoner Review Board issued an order revoking Courtney’s mandatory supervised release. The Board’s order said he would be released “upon the approval of a viable host site as determined by IDOC.” No suitable host site was ever approved, however, so he completed his one-year term of mandatory supervised release in prison.
Courtney sued, but was rebuffed in federal court, as a judge determined his lawsuit was essentially an improper attempt to use a lawsuit to call into question the validity of a state criminal conviction or sentence, which is not allowed under the U.S. Supreme Court's 1994 decision in 1994’s Heck v. Humphrey.
The Heck decision also extends to civil litigation that would call into question the validity of a parole revocation, at least when the revocation is based on the parolee’s wrongdoing.
But on appeal, a panel of three judges at the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals said the case presents a new question: Namely, whether and how Heck applies when release on parole is denied, based not on the parolee’s actions, but on state officials’ alleged failure to do their jobs.
Seventh Circuit Judge David F. Hamilton wrote the panel’s opinion, issued May 3. Circuit Judges Ilana D. Rovner and Michael B. Brennan concurred.
The panel found Heck poses no bar to Courtney’s claims that at least some defendants deliberately or recklessly acted or failed to act in ways that caused him to spend an extra year in prison. The appeals judges upheld the district court’s dismissal of Courtney’s challenges to the Board’s Nov. 14, 2013 order revoking his mandatory supervised release. But the appeals court reversed the dismissal of his other claims.
Courtney’s claims that the IDOC defendants, after Nov. 14, deliberately or recklessly ignored his grievances and communications regarding possible host sites, if substantiated, would not necessarily imply the Board’s decision to revoke his supervised release was invalid.
The judges noted Courtney did not act or fail to act, in any way he could control, to violate the terms of his scheduled release. He alleges that after the Board entered its order revoking his supervised release, defendants deprived him of liberty by deliberately or recklessly failing to carry out their duties to respond to his grievances; to investigate his proposed host sites; and, if necessary, to assist him in finding a suitable site. He may bring that claim without undermining the board’s finding that he lacked an approved host site at the time.
“In fact, far from attacking the Board’s order, Courtney seeks to vindicate it,” Hamilton wrote. “The order instructed that Courtney should be released ‘upon the approval of a viable host site as determined by IDOC.’ Heck does not bar these claims.”
The panel also found Heck did not bar Courtney’s claims that defendants deliberately or recklessly failed to investigate potential host sites or to respond to his grievances before Nov. 14.
Though the Board’s order was styled as a “violation,” the order did not revoke Courtney’s supervised release because he engaged in any act of his own volition that violated terms of his mandatory supervised release. As Courtney stressed, he never lived at a location that violated the conditions of his release. Rather, his mandatory supervised release was revoked because an item on his release checklist was unchecked: He had no approved host site.
“That Courtney’s ‘violation’ is poorly named is evident from the order itself.” Hamilton wrote. “It distinguishes between violating the terms of supervised release and lacking an approved host site. Because his release was contingent on the IDOC approving a host site, the Board’s order was, at bottom, based not on a finding that Courtney had done anything wrong but on a finding that defendants in the Department had not done something: Approved a host site for Courtney.”
In a special concurring opinion, Brennan said he agreed with the success of two of Courtney’s claims—those alleging the revocation decision was made without due process and without evidence of a violation—would necessarily imply that his parole revocation was invalid, and thus that dismissal of those claims was proper.
The harder question, he said, concerns Courtney’s claim that defendants’ deliberate indifference caused him to be imprisoned for longer than he should have. Success on this assertion implicates the duration of his incarceration, as he must demonstrate that absent defendants’ deliberate indifference, he would have been released sooner. That brings his third claim very close to the Heck bar, Brennan wrote. If Courtney prevails, it suggests a certain unfairness to his parole revocation.
A judgment in his favor means he should have been released sooner, but it does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his revocation.
A judgment for Courtney on his claim means the Board’s revocation was proper, but that defendants’ unconstitutional conduct still caused him to stay in prison longer than he otherwise might have. His claim thus falls short of necessarily implying the invalidity of his parole revocation.
The case was remanded for further proceedings.